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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal of the judgment and 
proceedings of the domestic relations case in the district court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
First Issue 
Did the trial court commit an error in law by improperly considering 
the income of third parties in making a determination on the question of 
alimony, in contravention of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii). 
Standard of Review: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) 
prohibits the consideration of the income of third parties other than the 
obligor's current spouse in making a determination on the question of 
alimony presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness with no special deference given to the 
trial court. Child v. Newsom, 892 P.2d 9, 10 (Utah 1995). 
Statement of Grounds: This issue concerns an error of law which 
could not be ascertained prior to the trial court's handing down of its ruling 
in its Memorandum Decision, and therefore does not require preservation 
of the issue below. 
1 
Second Issue 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in not considering the 
Petitioner's ability to pay in awarding attorney's fees subsequent to a 
finding that the Petitioner, as the supporting spouse, did not have the ability 
to pay more than the amount awarded in alimony. 
Standard of Review: "Whether the trial court's findings of fact in 
support of an award of attorney fees are sufficient is ... a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness" with no special deference given to the trial court. 
Selvage v. J J, Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252,. 1257 (Utah App.1996). 
Statement of Grounds: This issue concerns an error of law which 
could not be ascertained prior to the trial court's handing down of its ruling 
in its Memorandum Decision, and therefore does not require preservation 
of the issue below. 
RELEVANT STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 (Amd. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kenneth Warner ("Petitioner") filed for divorce from his wife 
Colleen Warner ("Respondent") on May 30, 2002. (R. at 1-7.) The 
2 
Respondent moved for an Order to Show Cause and requested a temporary 
support. (R. at 27-29.) The hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held 
on August 2, 2002 before Commissioner T. Patrick Casey. (R. at 70.) 
The Respondent objected to the Commissioner's findings, 
specifically arguing that the Commissioner "erred by failing to give 
adequate consideration to petitioner's historical income, ... respondent's 
needs, and petitioner's ability to pay while he is admittedly living with his 
girlfriend", and requested a hearing on the Objection. (R. at 82-83.) The 
Judge issued a Minute Entry denying the hearing and denying the 
Respondent's Objection. (R. at 111-113.) 
The divorce action was bifurcated and a Bifurcated Decree of 
Divorce was entered on September 23, 2003 on the grounds of 
"irreconcilable differences", and in which decree all matters other than the 
termination of the marriage were reserved. (R. at 175-177.) 
The reserved issues, including child support and alimony, were heard 
by the Third District Court Judge Timothy R. Hanson on July 1, 2004. (R. 
at 267.) The court issued a "Memorandum Decision" on August 12, 2004, 
from which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
3 
Divorce Following Bifurcation were entered on September 20, 2004. (R at 
239-238, 242-247.) 
In the Memorandum Decision, the Court made a ruling granting 
Child Support of $427 per month, and alimony at the rate of $1,757 per 
month. (R. at 235.) The Court also stated: "In the final analysis, the 
petitioner's financial needs are basically met by his minimal efforts at 
employment, the assistance of his girlfriend, and his family". (R. at 234.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Commissioner found that the Respondent's need exceeded the 
Petitioner's ability to pay. (R. at 79.) at who have no known 
2. The Commissioner then awarded a temporary child support 
amount of $427.00 per month and a temporary alimony amount of 
$1,757.00 per month based upon Petitioner's income of approximately 
$50,000.00 annually and an income imputed to Respondent of $18,000.00 
annually. (R. at 79.) 
3. The Commissioner also made a specific finding that 
"petitioner's ability to pay alimony is limited to $1,757.00". (R. at 116.) 
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4. The Judge issued a Minute Entry denying the hearing and 
denying the Responden t ' s Objection (R at 1 1 1 • 1 1 x) 
5. In the Memorandum. Decision, the Court,, made a nil in p 
grant ing Child Support of $42 7 per month , and annion) at the rale of 
$ I J > / " pei nIOIill ill!'! Jl .! 1 > > 
6. The court; stated that at torne\ :. itx ...... 
Ilic ivs[>on 111,1."in 1,"I. il! I ! .it
 l
1
 iHil'i in 
7. 1 he ""Findings of h i d .unit i:s o( 1 mi "  
pelilioiu'i I i 11 ^ i in hurst' ihr respondent SI 674.77 in at torneys ' fees. (R. at 
245.) 
8. In the M e m o r a n d u m Decision, the Court stated: " In the final 
analysis, the pet i t ioner ' s financial needs are basically met by his minimal 
efforts at employment , the assistance of his gin is family 
at 234.) 
S U M M A R Y O F T H E A R G U M E N T 
1
 The Court Erred in Consideration of Third Party Income in 
Determining Ability to Pay Alimony, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) prohibits the consideration of an 
obliger's current spouse in the determination of alimony except under 
5 
certain exceptional circumstances. The statute does not consider any 
occasions in which the income of any third part) - who is not the obliger's 
current spouse- may be com: rial court erred in considering the 
sharing of expenses with tne • .. ' • - .inr \c fmnni• ial 
assistance nl utlici Iiiiiiiiiiiil1, iiifinbas in making the determination that the 
Petitioner had the ability to pay alimony. 
II. The Court Errerd in Ordering Attorneys' Fees without 
Consideration of Obligor Spouse's Ability to Pay. 
The trial court commuted an error of law >u lanmg iu consiue. .... 
reuuoncr s ability .. ;* .- dt'*:irr r. - s :?esp- •• '-
)iirt had nreviously i die Petitioner 
could not pay the entire amount of the Respondent's needs in making an 
award of alimony. The subsequent award of attorney's fees to the 
Respondent, without also making a secondary and separate finding of fact 
in :»ii(i|iNiii!i!l I iiuu In .111 «i M,
 ni 111 m,,i" ik«aih tTironniiis MOIVOM in in thr tMisn1 
that ba r, even if the trial court had made findings of fact in support of its 
a vM ard of attorneys' fees, such a finding would have - as a logical necessity 
- required the making of a finding inconsistent w ith the court's own 
previous findm .,,. . eutioner di J - I ha« • llir ahihl „ In pjB> a\\ 
j in .mhl 1 , I .iilin'iinl) jwrirdt'd *>» iilininini\. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Below Committed Error by Considering Past 
Assistance and Support of Petitioner's Family in Determining 
Alimony 
The trial court committed legal error in considering the financial 
assistance Petitioner had received from others who were not his spouse, 
including his girlfriend and members ol Ins faiink, in making a 
determination on the 1Jo111u*11ci Main I 11 > hi pin 1111m111\ 
lemorandum Decision handed d ' h (Jit fu.i! " ilinlhe 
present case iiiiiil Xilal 111.ill llii ' I In im lilionor has been able to 
n - -^ his expenses through the assistance of his girlfriend, marginal work 
that he has obtained, and the assistance of his family, primarily to cover his 
attorney's fees , " (Record at 2^1) Tn making a determination ^. uwmony,, 
the "trial court must consider the linuncul , mdilions and iit/alis ml" (he 
leceiving spouse Ilit; .ilulir, r f icn/ivitifj spouse to produce a sufficient 
income, and the ability of supporting spouse to provide support", Marshall 
v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In determining the 
ability of the supporting spouse to pro\ide support requires trie mat 
also consider mat spouse ;< uiiroinc cinil cxpensi"-. us il would (v i npossil 
In .1 nil IM MSSHI tliiit n \\\\\\ r, "able" in pay i\ specmw amiiony award 
amount without first considering that party's income and expenses. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) specifically contemplates those 
occasions in which the income of a party's spouse may be considered in the 
determination of alimony. ' I he statute states: 
(iii) 111 determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the pa\or may no 
considered, except as pro\ idcd ir th;<3 
Subsection (8). 
(A) The court ma\ considei ilie 
subsequent spouse's financial ability 
to share living expenses, 
(B) The court max consider the income of 
a subsequent spouse if the court finds 
that the payor s improper conduct 
justifies that consideration. 
Id. 
The statute specifically excludes the consideration of the income of a 
subsequent spouse in the determination of alimony except m lmi,.- -
situations. Further, the statute does not mention any ottiei • .
 yi * ps, 
or class of individuals whose 111i1111ic t!i;i> h i • u m s i d e i * ' making a 
dtMerminal inn of alimony " I hus, it is reasonable to conclude that in 
making the statutory expression that the income or ability to share expenses 
1
 It is axiomatic in American Law that there are certain linguistic and 
textual inferences, which may be used in determining the meaning of a given 
statute, One of these "canons" of statutory interpretation is the principle 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which may be interpreted as "the expression 
of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others." Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett, 
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. Foundation Press, 2000, page 255. 
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of a payor •<' ".uhseiiPioMt spouse may only be considered in determining 
nlimonv in certain exceptional cases, the Utah Legislature has declaicd ili.ii 
the income of any and all other persons may noi k: utiisidetiTl in mnhnj.1 
alimony determinations. 
Such a reading of this statute is also supp* that 
"provisos and statutory exceptions1 * inh.i.i in iv.ui narrowly". Eskridge, 
Jbnckey and Cianvil, Legislation, and. Statutory Interpretation, Foundation 
Press, 2000 page 255. Accordingly, the exceptional cases in which I Hah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) allows the income or abiu; i.aie 
expenses of a subsequent spouse to be aiibideiol in di lining alimony 
_1
"uld be limited to include wni - Hi iih^qucnt spouse, and not other third 
p:lilies, sue Ii as it subsequent girlfriend, a parent, or other friends or family 
members. 
An examination of the significant differences between a person's 
spouse and a person's other friends and relations provides furtnui 
for the suggested interpretation ;\'i«;,,_. .. 
duties to one anolliu, ulm r\ *• • ^wrsive and permanent than 
those ("««- J HI ,i 11.n(i\ ni| i 11, others. 
While the law requires a parent to provide and support, his or her 
minor children, regardless of whether the parent lives with the child, is 
married to the child's other parent, or ha^ cubim ,s 
generally ex in. . ~ v a 12 e of maturity. I urther, 
in i»i" 1 1 *i,s nie can live together and act in many wajs 
pirviseh T, ;i niairied couple would, and yet—absent a finding of 
"common law marriage"—they have no legal duty to support.. 
In stark contrast, a person's duties of support to their spouse exist 
whether they live together or separately, whether" the) act as a inamal 
pie or not, whether they have childiei 1, i< d invspertiw1 of then 
ages. See, eg,, I kali 1 i1111 '• 1 • 1 i; "^ .1 | ef srti ( p r o v i d i n g for t he 
"separate; i i i i i i i i lenance" o f a s p o u s e w h o d o e s no t l ive w i th t h e s u p p o r t i n g 
spouse). The only way that a person can become "divorced1" ol their duties 
to their spouse is through judicial intervention. 
The social and legal nature of the spousal relationship suggests, 
among other things, permanency . , tkes, sense to allow 
consideration ol ii spouse *: im * -• -. • 1 making a pennanent 
detenu in at 1011 1* I lowever, it makes no sense to allow the 
income or support of non-spouse third parties to be considered when 
making such determinations, in light of the limited and transient nature of 
the duties arising from those relationships. 
Legislative enactments and subsequent decisions of this Court 
following the Utah Supreme Court decision A/t.,«.« i. /w<. M /, c; r 
(Utah 1980) support inks K , ^ M M —; 
In Kiesel the Utah Supreme Court considered a ;ai:.u .^  cuitu 
that a trial cour: ..;*,; ,.-^ • i:** • ; ? -Pttinghis 
> uue uidi a snaugei to a / u o action 
should not be constrained, by reasc . > - * m arri age, 
to lend financial support to his or her spouse's 
children by a prior marriage, the court is not 
precluded from taking such circumstances into 
2
 Support for this a\\c\ pretation of Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) may be 
found by a review of legislative statements and signals that have been expressed 
through legislative actions on similar matters. One such informative review 
concerns actions by the Utah Legislature in determining the appropriateness of 
considering a subsequent spouse's income and sharing of expenses when 
determining an award of child support. In proceedings involving the setting or 
the modification of child support, the ability of the pa>or spouse to pay is a factor 
which is considered in the determination v: ,-•: •ilarly\ proceedings such as the one 
at bar which concern determinations of alimony require the consideration of the 
at Ility of the payor spouse to pay the requested support. Because the "ability to 
pay" factor is considered in both instances, legislative actions and judicial 
precedents from each can effectively inform those of the other. See Pqffel v. 
PaffeU 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (holding that a finding governing the 
propriety of considering a subsequent spouse's income in a proceeding for the 
increase of child support was applicable to a proceeding considering the award of 
spousal support where both cases considered ability to pay as factor in making 
determination). 
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consideration in determining the ability of one who 
does have the legal obligation to pay. 
Id at 1376. Subsequently, the Utah Legislature passed Section 78-45-7.4 
of the Utah Code Annotated, which "limits the discretion of trial courts by 
prohibiting them from considering a new spouse's income in setting child 
support obligations". Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
In Paffel v. Pqffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court, relying in part on Kiesel, upheld the award of alimony by a trial 
court in which the court considered evidence of the ex-husband's present 
spouse as a circumstance affecting his ability to provide support. Id. at 
102. Again, the Legislature revised the controlling law to limit the 
consideration of the present spouse's income. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(7)(g)(ii) (1995) (amending L. 1994, ch. 284.). The Legislature's 1995 
amendment of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 includes the language now found 
in § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii), which includes the prohibition on considering the 
income or support of a subsequent spouse except under certain exceptions. 
Id. 
If any trend or signal is to be discerned from the Legislature's 
actions regarding the consideration of the income of third parties in making 
12 
determinations on spousal support or child support, it is that the Legislature 
intends to exclude consideration of such third parties. 
In the alternative, if § 30-3-5(6)(g)(iii) is not read to exclude the 
consideration of individuals who are not current spouses of the supporting 
spouse in an alimony determination, then those individuals who are 
considered should be considered under the same factors as a subsequent 
spouse is considered. That is to say, they should be excluded except to 
consider the sharing of expenses with the payor spouse, or unless the court 
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
In the present case, the court did not make a finding as to the fault of 
the Petitioner, which would justify the consideration of a spouse's—or 
another's—income in the determination of alimony. Even if the trial court 
had made such a finding, those findings would have to be "detailed enough 
and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to 
reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented". Sampinos v. 
Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, the 
"[f]ailure to substantiate such findings constitutes reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontro verted, and capable of supporting 
13 
only a finding in favor of the judgment5 ." Id. (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 
131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).* 
By way of example, before even finding a spouse responsible for 
contributing to the support of a former spouse, the "trial court must 
consider the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income, and the ability of 
supporting spouse to provide support". Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 at 516. 
Therefore, even if it were appropriate to consider the income or ability to 
share expenses of a third party in making an alimony determination, it 
would be grossly unjust and inappropriate to fail to consider the "ability to 
provide support" of the third party who, by virtue of the court's decision, 
must then essentially provide support.4 If not, then a party to a divorce 
3
 The record contains allegations of fault and evidence to support a finding 
of fault against either or both parties. In the absence of a specific finding of fault 
in the present case, a showing of any evidence that would controvert such a 
finding against the Petitioner is sufficient to show that the facts are capable of 
supporting findings other than a finding in favor of (a presumed finding of fault) 
in the judgment. For example, the Respondent testified that she only visited her 
husband who lived in an adjoining state "twice in fourteen months" (R. at 157.), 
and the Petitioner testified that, during that time, the Respondent obtained credit 
cards without her husband's knowledge and failed to pay the corresponding bills, 
which put her husband's job and career in jeopardy (R. at 33-40,47.) Either of 
these facts alone provide sufficient controverting evidence in this case. 
4
 See, e.g., Paffel at 101 (holding that court properly considered the income 
of ex-husband's present spouse as a circumstance affecting his ability to pay, 
particularly in light of failure to make a timely objection to the admission of such 
14 
would be protected from support obligations, which are financially 
untenable, by the mere existence of third parties with relationships with a 
party, which would not be afforded such protection. 
In the final analysis, a finding in favor of the trial court's decision in 
the present case would be tantamount to the creation of a new regime of 
support law in the State of Utah. It would be a regime in which the 
siblings, parents, aunts or girlfriends of the parties to a divorce may be 
considered and obliged by the court to provide ongoing or additional 
support one or both of the parties because of the parties' combined inability 
to support themselves. Such a proposition is legally unfounded and 
represents poor public policy. 
The Appellant urges this Court to find that the trial court committed 
reversible legal error in considering the intermittent and temporary support 
received by Petitioner from his family and girlfriend in making a 
determination that the Petitioner had the requisite "ability to pay" the 
alimony award. 
evidence, and in light of the fact that the ex-husband himself presented testimony 
on expenses of himself and his present spouse.) 
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II. The Court Committed Error by Awarding Attorney Fees to 
Respondent Subsequent to Determination that Petitioner was 
Unable to Pay Entire Amount of Alimony 
The trial court made an error of law in founding that Petitioner could 
not pay the entire amount of Respondent's needs in making an award of 
alimony, and then subsequently making an award of attorney's fees to 
Respondent, without finding that the Petitioner did have the ability to pay 
for Respondent's need. In this case, the trial court committed error by both 
ordering attorney's fee subsequent to a finding that Petitioner was already 
unable to pay alimony and by failing to make the logically incongruent 
finding that Petitioner had the ability to pay the Respondent's attorney's 
fees. 
While, Utah law grants the trial court the authority to award 
attorney's fees in a divorce action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
the "decision to make such an award " fmust be based on evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to 
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees/ " Marshall v. Marshall, 
915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 
547, 555 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, the failure to consider any of the 
enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee issue. See Willey at 
547; Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991). 
16 
In the case below, the trial court did not give adequate consideration 
nor make adequate findings on the question of the Petitioner's ability to 
pay an award of attorneys' fees. 
The Commissioner had found that the Respondent's need exceeded 
the Petitioner's ability to pay. (R. at 79.) The Commissioner then awarded 
a temporary child support amount of $427.00 per month and a temporary 
alimony amount of $1,757.00 per month based upon Petitioner's income of 
approximately $50,000.00 annually and an income imputed to Respondent 
of $18,000.00 annually. (R. at 79.) The Commissioner also made a 
specific finding that "petitioner's ability to pay alimony is limited to 
$1,757.00". (R. at 116.) 
The Respondent objected to the Commissioner's findings, 
specifically that the Commissioner "erred by failing to give adequate 
consideration to petitioner's historical income, ... respondent's needs, and 
petitioner's ability to pay while he is admittedly living with his girlfriend", 
and requested a hearing on the Objection. (R. at 99.) The Judge issued a 
Minute Entry denying the hearing and denying the Respondent's Objection. 
(R. at 111-113.) 
The Minute Entry stated, in relevant part, that 
17 
"... the parties5 financial picture has been altered 
dramatically, particularly since the petitioner is no 
longer employed in the same capacity or under the 
same pay standards. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that while the current amount of support 
has been approximately cut in half, this amount 
only reflects the reality of the situation that the 
petitioner simply does not have the same resources 
from which he can continue to pay the prior level 
of support. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 
the Commissioner's recommendation is justified. 
The respondent's objection is denied." 
(R. at 112.) 
Thus, it was the finding of the Commissioner and the Court that 
Petitioner's income as used as a basis for the Temporary Order was not 
sufficient to pay for Respondent's financial need. Moreover, the trial court 
incorporated by reference its own prior ruling upholding the commissioners 
finding that the respondents need exceeded the Petitioner's ability to pay. 
Counsel for Petitioner pointed out the insufficiency of the parties' 
resources on the record, stating: 
There's not enough money in this case, however 
you cut it, however one assesses it, there's not 
enough here to pay both parties reasonable living 
expenses. That was the finding of the 
commissioner, and I think that's still the case. 
(R. at 398.) 
18 
The trial court did not find that the Petitioner should be imputed any 
higher amount of income after trial on the merits than was imputed for the 
purposes of the Temporary Order. In fact, in its Memorandum Decision, 
the trial court stated: "The Court is satisfied that the temporary Order ought 
to become the permanent Order...". (R. at 236.) However, the trial court 
did not make any findings concerning the Petitioner's ability to pay 
attorneys' fees, beyond those findings made in the previous determination 
on the question of alimony confirming that the income levels used to 
compute the support amounts on the Temporary Order were the appropriate 
income levels. (R. at 235.) 
Thus, the trial court failed to make an appropriate finding as to the 
Petitioner's ability to pay attorney's fees, which requires a separate 
analysis and necessitates findings of fact in support of the court's award of 
attorney's fees. See Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18, 19 
P.3d 1005 (trial court must base award of attorney fees and costs in divorce 
case upon evidence of receiving spouse's need, payor spouse's ability to 
pay and reasonableness of fees). In making an analysis on the Petitioner's 
ability to pay attorney's fees, a trial court must examine not only the 
Petitioner's income, but also his expenses. 
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Moreover, in the present case, even if the trial court had made 
appropriate findings, the trial court's award of alimony should certainly 
have been considered as an "expense" to the Petitioner. Based upon the 
income that was imputed to the Petitioner, his net monthly income is only 
$3,363.00. When the support and alimony award of $2,184.00 is 
subtracted from that amount, the Petitioner is left with $1,179.00 on which 
to live. Although the payment of attorneys' fees is a one time expense, it is 
difficult to see how someone who nets under $1200.00 per month can be 
expected to pay several thousand dollars in attorney's fees for his wife. 
Even more significantly, given that both the Commissioner's 
findings and the Court's findings were that the Respondent's needs 
regarding support and alimony are in excess of the Petitioner's ability to 
pay, the trial court's award of attorney's fees (which requires a finding of 
Petitioner's ability to pay in excess of the amount which the court has 
already found is the most the Petitioner can pay) is manifestly unjust. 
Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees, 
and should further hold that it would be manifestly unjust to make a finding 
that the Petitioner has the ability to pay the Respondent's attorney's fees in 
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light of the trial court's previous finding regarding the award of alimony 
that the Respondent's needs exceed the Petitioner's ability to pay. 
Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees, and should further hold that it would be manifestly unjust to make a 
finding that Petitioner has the ability to pay Respondent's attorney's fees in 
light of the trial court's previous finding regarding the award of alimony 
that Respondent's needs exceed Petitioner's ability to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant urges this Court to find that the trial court committed 
reversible legal error and reverse and remand the following decisions of the 
trial court. First, as the trial court erred by considering the support 
provided to the Petitioner by his family and girlfriend in making a 
determination that the Petitioner had the requisite "ability to pay" the 
alimony award, this Court should reverse the trial courts alimony award, 
subject to remand back to the trial court for a proper evaluation of 
Petitioner's ability to pay. Second, as the trial court erred in not 
considering Petitioner's inability to pay in granting an award of attorneys' 
fees, this Court should strike the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to 
Respondent. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ASHWORtH HUNT, PLLC 
Bl 
JU&EH<r T. ASHWORTH 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5. 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred 
during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
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obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities 
and regarding the parties1 separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an 
order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care 
expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that 
the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be 
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial 
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to 
children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce 
may be added to the decree by modification. 
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(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights 
of grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall 
consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time 
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any 
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule 
entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time 
provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the 
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a 
parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the 
immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
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(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in 
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
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duration, when no children have been conceived or bom during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court 
may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony 
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to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify 
that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of 
the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the 
court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of 
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment 
of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if 
the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of 
alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
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terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session 
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